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"In the excitement over the unfolding of his scientific
and technical powers, modern man has built a system of
production that ravishes nature and a type of society that
mutilates man. If only there were more and more wealth,
everything else, it is thought, would fall into place.
Money is considered to be all-powerful; if it could not
actually buy nonmaterial values, such as justice, harmony,
beauty, or even health, it could circumvent the need for
them or compensate for their loss. The development of
production and the acquisition of wealth have thus become
the highest goals of the modern world in relation to which
all other goals, no matter how much lip-service may still be
paid to them, have come to take second place. The highest
goals require no justification; all secondary goals have
finally to justify themselves in terms of the service their
attainment renders to the attainment of the highest. This
is the philosophy of materialism, and it is this philosophy
- or metaphysics - which is now being challenged by
events
. . .
We shrink back from the truth if we believe that the
destructive forces of the modern world can be brought under
control simply by mobilizing more resources - of wealth,
education, and research - to fight pollution, to preserve
wildlife, to discover new sources of energy, and to arrive
at more effective agreements on peaceful coexistence.
Needless to say, wealth, education, research, and many other
things are needed for any civilization, but what is most
needed today is a revision of the ends, which these means
are meant to serve. And this implies, above all else, the
development of a life-style which accords to material things
their proper, legitimate place, which is secondary and not
primary .
"
E. F. SCHUMACHER
Saall is Beautiful
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INTRODUCTION
Since the start of the decolonization process, most of
the Third World nations have been constantly engaged in
achieving two interrelated goals: (a) political
consolidation and nation building and, (b) modernization of
their societies through the diffusion of technology for
economic growth (Montavon 1979). Modernization is presently
the most important goal before these societies. Along with
the political questions related to the institutional
structure existing within them, strategies and policies in
the area of modernization through technology transfer
are, however, being questioned.
The issue of appropriate technology, linked as it is
with the views of policy-makers, cannot be divorced from
politics. Within this framework, intervention by outside
agents through the transfer of technology from rich to poor
countries is filled with difficulties, especially in terms
of the ethical dilemmas it raises. Some criticisms,
reflecting on past experiences, argue that the only
favorable solution is to cease intervention altogether. I
believe, however that any such indiscriminate rejection is
incorrect, just as indiscriminate acceptance of intervention
is also irresponsible. The benefit which outsiders can
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bring, I hold, should not be completely denied, especially
in the face of real needs. To take the question of
intervention seriously, then, is to ask under what terms and
conditions and under what guidelines should service be
rendered
.
Technology transfer has become a very emotional issue
in many developing countries, particularly in those where
governments, while understanding the importance of the
subject, do not fully appreciate the complexities of the
transfer process.
When the question is debated in international
conferences, the industrialized nations and the
multinational corporations are often accused of narrow
selfishness, of charging exorbitant fees or royalties, of
enforcing a multitude of restrictive provisions, and of
completely neglecting the interests of the recipients. The
multinational corporations admit that excesses may have been
committed in isolated cases, but reject blanket condemnation
and assert that, overall, the transfer has been a successful
one (Martin 1981). Their arguments, however, do not seem to
have been very convincing since in a growing number of
countries restrictive legislation has or is being enacted, a
policy which many consider to be dangerous and
self-defeating in the long run.
There is no doubt that countries whose potential in
human and natural resources has not yet been translated into
effective production will have to acquire essential
technologies corresponding both to their specific ecology
and needs. The extent to which they do so will determine
whether the crisis affecting the modern world is solved
peacefully or not. The developing countries await a correct
scientific answer to the difficult questions involved in the
development of tropical and equatorial zones. They are
convinced that this scientific approach can and must be
reflected in effective technologies commensurate with their
needs and resources. They know that a wealthy nation's
technology, which is itself the result of a long effort
starting from initial poverty, is not always capable of
responding within the required time to the urgent challenge
of poverty.
By force of circumstances these countries must follow
an essentially austere economic path in order to ensure that
the essential needs of their people are met within a
reasonable and politically acceptable period of time.
However, too little is known about the basic interactions of
technology with development, and too little is known in most
instances about the basic characteristics of the developing
countries to permit construction of an optimum plan for use
of technology development. Within this framework, the
present report demonstrates that, in the absence of such
information, planning for the integration of technology has
tended to become capricious and inconsistent. Furthermore,
this study also discusses some actions that could be pursued
by local governments in order to improve the process of
adoption and dissemination of appropriate technology in
local contexts.
Definitions
Technology may be defined as the systematic application
of collective human rationality to the solution of problems
by asserting control over nature and over human processes of
all kind (Goulet 1977). Technology is generally the result
of systematic research which is disciplined and cumulative.
Moreover, it is not mere intellectual speculation or
theoretical modeling but rather knowledge applied to
practical problems. Furthermore, this systematically
applied human reason must operate in a social context and
result in a tool, process, or object which can be used by
others. Technological activity, then, aims at expanding and
improving the ability of human beings to control the natural
and social forces which surround them.
Because most "modern" technology has originated outside
underdeveloped countries, it is essential to define
technology transfer. For British economist Charles Cooper
technology transfer is "the exchange from advanced to
developing countries of the elements of technical know-how
which are normally required in setting up and operating new
production facilities and which are normally in very short
supply or totally absent in developing economies." This
definition is not comprehensive enough, however, because
there are also many technologies which do not relate
directly to the operation of p r o d u c t - p r o d u c i n g or
-processing facilities. Thus, the concept of technology
transfer must also embrace the circulation of know-how used
to conduct feasibility or marketing studies and to manage
varied services in terms of transportation, distribution,
etc
.
The term transfer as used in this report refers to the
circulation of know-how across national boundaries; excluded
from consideration are transfers of technology from one
sector to another within nations. More narrowly viewed,
technology transfers are related to the circulation of
know-how which is directly applied to the production of
goods, the provision of services, and the formulation of
decisions (as to site, engineering design, scale, etc.)
affecting these.
Purpose and Scope
Technology is a vast domain touching all sectors of
human activity. A question arises, therefore, as to which
technology transfers are included and which are excluded
from the scope of this report. Because some choice bearing
on manageability of data had to be made, it is focused on
industrial technologies used in production, with only
secondary attention paid to agricultural and communication
technologies. Even though the impact of military technology
transfers is important today, it is not studied here because
proper study of this matter requires special access to data
which are unavailable.
This report centers only on transactions between
developed countries and Latin America, but even within that
continent, comprehensive coverage has not been attempted.
Moreover, because broad differences between large and small
nations, structurally complex societies and those less so,
and those possessing different technical capacities are
mirrored in the larger Third World (including Asia, Africa,
and the Arab countries), the value of generalizations drawn
from this work will be limited. Nevertheless, value
conflicts in industry do illustrate larger patterns of
technological dependency, tensions between efficiency
and social goals, and the crucial importance of overall
incentive systems in any society.
An important distinction must also be made between
those value conflicts which pit Third World nations against
rich-country exporters of technology and those which weigh
on poor populations whenever technological decisions are
monopolized by a specialized elite, whether foreign or
domestic. In this sense, the present report is situated
primarily at the level of relations conducted across
national boundaries. Nonetheless, tensions between national
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decision-makers and nonexpert majorities hover constantly in
the background, especially when criteria for technology
policy are discussed and incompatibilities surface between
technological efficiency and broader goals such as social
justice or job-creation. To oscillate from one pole to
another is not fully avoidable, inasmuch as strong
correlations exist between Third World countries' attempts
as nations to improve their relative bargaining position in
international technology arenas and their domestic efforts
to remove technological power from the hands of few
specialists. Clearly there can be no "technology for the
people" if control is vested in foreign corporations. On
the other hand, shifting control from foreigners to national
technicians, politicians, or entrepreneurs cannot, of
itself, guarantee a policy which benefits the masses.
One of the major objectives of this report is to
examine the vital connection which links the value content
of modern technology to basic development strategies and to
technology policies adopted in the developing countries of
Latin America. In order to accomplish this, Part I of
this report explores the background of the transfer process.
In Chapter 1, a prior question is asked: What is the
relation between technology and development? To answer this
question, there have been selected four aspects in the way
technology affects development. Technology is considered
as:
1) A major resource for creating new wealth;
2) An instrument allowing its owners to exercise
social control in various forms in the way it
creates new organization for production;
3) A means of affecting modes of decision-making; and
4) A means of affecting patterns of alienation
characteristic of affluent societies.
The study of technology transfer as a division of the
study of economic growth and social change is not well
developed as an explicit focus of academic interest.
However, all theories of economic development and social
change contain within them more or less implicit positions
on the role and impact of technology transfer on
development. In chapter 2 of this report three groups
of theories are identified in terms of the scale of analysis
at which these theories operate and whether or not
development is defined within them entirely in terms of the
benefits of economic growth:
1) The first group of theories can be called
"Modernization Theories." They focus on national
societies as the basic units of analysis and define
development in terms of economic growth and
"Westernization," replicating the historical
experience of Western societies (Tipps 1973; Pletsch
1981).
2) The second group consists of theories that focus on
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the structure of economic and political
relationships between "dominant" and "dominated"
societies in the context of the global history of
economic growth and political control. These
theories are called "World Political Economy
Theories" (Evans 1979; Agnew 1982).
3) A third group of theories takes an approach that
involves a critical perspective on the purported
benefits of development as usually defined and
emphasizes the ecological and soc i o / c u 1 1 u r a 1
disruption consequent to economic growth (Yapa
1980). Currently this is the last known theory of
development and involves the greatest departure from
conventional wisdom.
The literature has tended to single out a "bundle" of
theories of development, variously described as
modernization and neo-classical economic theories, and to
label them as "dif f usionist . " The implication is that these
theories emphasize diffusion (and technology transfer) while
others do not. Within this framework, the discussion in
this section of the present report is centered on exploring
the links between theories of development and positions on
technology transfer in order to appreciate how the different
perspectives on technology transfer fit with the various
theories of development.
Technology, far from being an inert deposit of
practical knowledge, is itself a rapidly evolving system
operating within larger systems also undergoing dynamic
transformation. Chapter 3 explores briefly various sources
of technological dynamism. These include the competitive
capitalist and socialist structures operative in the
developed world, the interaction among basic value choices
and preferred development strategies in a given society and
its relation with technology; and the "sequence of
dependency" which marks relations between rich and poor
countries in arenas of international exchange.
Technology is portrayed as a "two-edged sword,"
simultaneously the bearer and destroyer of values (Goulet
1977). It originates in "developed" societies and
circulates rapidly in the world through a variety of
transfer channels. Much of the current controversy
concerning the means of providing technology to the
developing countries centers on the nature and conditions
of such provision and on the effects of these conditions on
the recipient nations. Chapter 4 of this report discusses
the conflicts which arise through transfer of technology at
three different levels:
1) Competing interests of buyers and sellers of
technology
;
2) Tensions between overall development goals and the
impact of imported technology on developing nations;
3) General questions as to the possibility of
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harnessing technology in any society to such humane
ends as a satisfying scale operations, ecological
soundness, and the just allocation of resources.
The correct choice of technology to be applied to local
situations is critical not only to increase general
productivity and wealth, but also to increase well-being and
to preserve the quality of life and the environment. Thus,
Part II of this report moves beyond those general issues
presented in Part I to formulate ethical strategies in one
specific arena of development decision-making: technology
policy. Part II of this study formulates how cooperation
between developed countries and the host country can be
improved with regard to the transfer of technology. It is
precisely through this cooperation that the developing
countries would be able not only to acquire the foreign
technology under the best financial, technical, political
and social conditions, but also to expand their capacity to
absorb technology as part of the process of developing a
degree of technological economy in the long term.
It is perhaps significant that the preferred phrase in
the literature has been "transfer of technology" rather
than, for example, "the advancement of technology in
developing countries." The choice of the phrase clearly
reflects (a) the view that technology is a concrete
possession which can be passed over; and (b) that in their
technology the developed countries have an acquisition which
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has been denied to the developing countries and which should
be facilitated to them. The choice of the phrase "transfer
of technology" also reflects another basic sentiment
within developing countries; the possession of technology
should not be a matter of commercial advantage but, in the
name of social justice, should be made generally available
to all who need it.
The stress in the future might more suitably be placed,
not on the ways in which developed countries should "hand
over" technology to developing countries, but on the ways
both parties can cooperate to engender the fastest possible
growth of technological capacity in the developing
countries
.
12
PART I
THE BACKGROUND OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
As the creation and expansion of technologically
oriented societies is generally accepted as the best if not
the only hope for sustained progress for the poor of the
world, the dissatisfaction with the relationships of the
technology transfer process with the scientific, technical,
and cultural environment in the host country constitutes a
serious problem. Part I of this report first deals with the
impact of technology on development and the existing links
between theories of development and positions on technology
transfer. The value content and dynamisms of "modern"
technology as well as the institutional framework of the
transfer process are also analyzed throughout the first four
chapters of this report.
In Part I, particular emphasis is placed on ethical and
value questions on the existing mechanisms and channels of
technology transfer. Thus, it becomes necessary to raise
the issues of freedom and just society. Although
development can be studied as an economic, political,
educational, or social phenomenon, its ultimate goals are
those of existence itself: to provide all men with the
opportunity to live full human lives.
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CHAPTER 1
TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
Technology is viewed by many of the leaders of the
various developing nations as a key to national autonomy and
status in the world community. Automotive plants, steel
mills, and atomic reactors have also become status symbols
of achievement regardless of economic and social costs.
Effectiveness in developing and applying technology
depends upon linkages to scientific knowledge and to broader
cultural contexts. Linking the understanding of nature to
empirical knowledge aimed at controlling the environment
took many centuries of gradual development. The
technological revolution which followed the scientific
revolution brought together "application and cognition,
matter and the mind, tool and purpose, knowledge and
control" (Donner 1976, 3:36-44). Associated with these
linkages were basic changes in social values and attitudes
and in economic policies and organization.
Repeated reference has been made to the growing
technological gaps between industrially advanced and
industrially developing areas of the world. It is important
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to distinguish the potential gains to productivity and the
industrial growth rate derived from improvements in
management, in economic policy, an in technological
structure. The latter refers to induced characteristics of
plant size and production scale, the accommodation of
techniques to factor scarcities, specialization and
interdependence among plants contributing to related end
products, and the types of managers and innovators
associated with production modes. Market development also
has been repeatedly cited as the prime mover in
technological development (Ward 1968, 7-19). Technological
adjustment can only be made within a framework of economic
policy and managerial capability.
This study in technology transfer examines competing
visions of benefits sought in technological exchanges.
Within this framework, the relation between technology and
development must first be elucidated.
The Relationship of Technology to Development
Technology affects development in four ways: It is a
major resource for creating new wealth; it is an instrument
allowing its owners to exercise social control in various
forms; it affects modes of decision-making; and it relates
directly to patterns of alienation characteristic of
affluent societies (Goulet 1977, 7).
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Technology as Resource
These who seek development await such benefits as
improved material living standards and new wealth through
greater production and productivity. Most development
agents assign an important role to technology in reaching
these objectives. Indeed, if suitably chosen and properly
applied, technology can add greatly to a society's pool of
resources. Technology as a resource must obviously be
distinguished from other types of resources, particularly
"natural" resources which exist in different states of
exploitation. Many resources, in turn, are not natural but
human creations - capital, machinery, infrastructures.
Human skills themselves range from strong muscles for
pushing wheelbarrows to elaborate forms of knowledge
needed to program computers. Technology is merely one
special kind of human skill: the know-how derived from
scientific knowledge and incorporated in some object,
process, or activity.
For centuries most resources have consisted of tangible
goods supplied by nature: fertile land, plentiful game,
abundant ores, lush timber, etc. As economic life grew more
complex, however, humanly created resources took on greater
relative importance. Labor skills, communication networks,
symbols which conferred meaning to tasks, and social-
incentive systems all became "factors" of production.
Moreover, with the advent of capitalist industrialism, still
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other "resources" such as entrepreneurial skills, access to
diversified markets, and negotiating talents, gained
salience. Thus the creation of technology became an
economic activity, responsive to pressures of demand and
supply. Laboratories were built as factories for producing
technology, which came to be perceived as a special capital
good with an exceptionally high multiplier effect.
Technology is a key resource because those who possess it
can be capable of possessing finance capital and other
resources as "natural" resources. Conversely, without
technology, even an abundance of other factors of production
augurs ill for economic success.
But technology never exists in a social vacuum; it is
owned by identifiable interest groups who may use it as an
instrument of social control.
Technology as Instrument of Social Control
Multinational corporations have long used their special
mastery of technology to gain for themselves not only the
economic advantages but cultural and political influence as
well
.
The exercise of social control by technological elites
is greatly facilitated by the arcane language and symbolism
they employ. Technological knowledge confers upon these who
possess it the power to define problems, to delimit
alternative solutions, and to influence outcomes.
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Most Latin American nations have pursued modern
technology not only for economic reasons but also to reduce
their vulnerability to control by technologically advanced
nations. Technological mastery is indeed a passport to
decision-making power.
Technology and Decision-Making
Some have contended that today's problems are so
complex that only specialists know how to define problems
and list possible solutions. Others have retorted that this
very complexity condemns elitism to failure and makes it
necessary for the presumed beneficiaries of technology to
express their values and aspirations before choices are
made. The question here is whether technology's proper
dynamism is compatible with these modal values in decision-
making.
Feedback operations are essential. They prevent
nonexperts from gaining access to essential parameters of
the decision process before these are congealed. Some have
rejected this portrayal and insist that initial formulations
of problems and alternative solutions are themselves the
product of some prior exchange in which a first round of
feedback leads to a second round of feed-in, and so on.
Whatever one's position is, one conclusion emerges: the
technological feasibility of circulating information and
counter-information conditions decisional modes.
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As decisional procedures come to depend increasingly on
technology, the danger arises that decision-making with a
strong will to power will gain alarming advantages over
peers whose primary allegiance is to justice or compassion.
That this danger is neither illusory nor remote is
illustrated by recent trends in medical and genetic
technology as applied to social engineering (Seeley 1974,
1-13).
Technology and Alienation in Abundance
Technology reduces the totality of human meaning to
those of its elements which are amenable to problem-solving.
Widespread alienation is an eloquent sign that the meaning
of life hitherto supplied by cultural belief systems cannot
be replaced by technology. Psychologist Erich Fromm points
to the equally dehumanizing effects of both "alienation in
affluence" and "alienation in misery" (Fromm 1966, ix).
His perception stands valid even in the face of the
conventional retort that "it is better to be rich and
miserable than poor and miserable." What psychologists
have learned of relative deprivation suggests that even if
poor individuals harbor no hope for personal improvement,
the mere vision of a "better" material life on the horizon
gives them grounds for escape in fantasy. This form of
relief is not longer available, however, to those whose
material fantasies have nowhere else to go.
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Hence technology is critical to development for four
reasons: (1) technology is a resource and the creator of new
resources; (2) it is a powerful instrument of social control
even as it offers deliverance from underdevelopment; (3) it
bears on the quality of decision-making to achieve social
change; and (4) it constitutes a central arena wherein new
meanings must be created to counter alienation, the
antithesis of meaningful living.
19
CHAPTER 2
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT
The study of technology transfer as a division of the
study of economic growth and social change is not well
developed as an explicit focus of academic interest.
However, all theories of economic development and social
change contain within them more or less implicit positions
on the role and impact of technology transfer on
development
.
This chapter is concerned with exploring the links
between theories of development and positions on technology
transfer. The set of development theories reviewed is
derived from an extensive though not exhaustive reading in
the literature. The positions on technology transfer are
based on a typology of diffusion perspectives that serves as
an organizing principle in the book by Brown (1981).
Theories of Development
A theory of development typically involves defining the
concept "development" and providing a rationale for
spatial-temporal differences in its extent. In most
20
theories, "levels" of development equate with levels of
economic growth. The definition of Havens and Flinn (1975,
23:469-481) is fairly typical though more specific than
most:
Development
... involves three interrelated societal
activities: (1) the establishment of increased wealth
and income as a perceived, attainable goal for the
broader masses of a society; (2) the creation and/or
selection of adequate means to attain this goal; and
(3) the restructuring of society so that there is
persistent economic growth
Over the past twenty years "development studies" has
come to constitute an increasingly large and vocal
interdisciplinary field in social science. Within this
field and associated areas of study, such as political
development and cultural change, a range of theories has
developed, drawing inspiration from a variety of
intellectual traditions.
Three groups of theories can be identified in terms of
the scale of analysis at which the theories operate and
whether or not development is defined entirely in terms of
the benefits of economic growth. The first group of
theories can be called "Modernization Theories." They focus
on national societies as the basic units of analysis and
define development in terms of economic growth and
"Weternization," replicating the historical experience of
Western societies (Tipps 1973, 15:199-226; Pletsch 1981,
23:565-590). The second group consists of theories that
focus on the structure of economic and political
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relationships between "dominant" and "dominated" societies
in the context of the global history of economic growth and
political control. These theories are called "World
Political Economy Theories" (Evans 1979, 49:15-20; Agnew
1982, 1:159-166). A third group of theories takes an
approach which involves a critical perspective on the
purported benefits of development as usually defined and
emphasizes the ecological and socio/cul t ura 1 disruption
consequent to economic growth (Yapa 1980, vol. 2).
Currently, this is the latest group of theories of
development and involves the greatest departure from
conventional wisdom.
Each of these groups of theories or "schools" is
actually and potentially divided by differences of emphasis,
specificity and academic disciplines. Table 2.1 contains a
list of the theories. In some cases the identified "theory"
covers a set of similar if not identical theories. This is
the case, for example, with dual economy, modernity, and
institutional reform theories.
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Table 2.1
Theories of Development
Modernization Stages of Growth
Dual Economy
Modernity
Institutional Reform
"Classic" Marxist
World Political Economy Leninist
Development of Underdevelopment
World-System
Multinational Corporation
Ecopolitical Economy Cultural Ecology of Development
Meaning of Development
Modernization Theories
The best known stages-of -growth theory is that of
Rostov (1956, 1960). Rostow divided European economic
history into five stages of growth that can be used as a
framework for national development whatever the particular
context. Agriculture is a leading sector in the transition
from "traditional" to "modern society." Technology plays an
important role in development by transforming traditional
agriculture into a base for industrial growth.
Commercialization of agriculture and the shift away from
subsistence production are particularly important in the
process of development.
The dual economy approach emerged out of an attempt to
understand the coexistence of a traditional sector and a
modern sector within those societies previously subjected to
Western colonialism. The major emphasis is upon the lack of
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interaction between the two sectors. The degree of
interaction, however, also figures as a major concern. This
is particularly the case in Lewis' "classic" version of the
dual economy theory (Lewis 1954, 22:139-191). Productivity
increases in agriculture are seen as the mechanism which
permits a movement of labor from the agricultural
(traditional) to the industrial (modern) sector.
Technological change in agriculture and/or dampening of
rates of population growth are viewed as central to this
process (Ranis and Fei 1961, 43:533-565).
Modernity and institutional reform theories are largely
the province of sociologists and political scientists who
focus on ideological and institutional components of
development. Implicitly, however, ideas about increasing
individualism and acceptance of Western ideas are also
important to growth stage and dual economy theories.
Development is seen as dependent upon the spread of an
"achievement orientation," the stimulation of
"entrepreneurial activity" and the institutionalization of
efficiency and productivity as defining elements of
rationality (Cochran 1966, 4:25-38; Montagno 1978,
6:561-568). The literature adopting this perspective is
very considerable and has a common assumption, the
importance of Western values to development.
The final modernization theory is usually not
characterized as such perhaps because of the "company" it is
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then forced to keep. But "classic" Marxist writings on
development, drawing on Marx's extensive writing on European
economic history and more limited writing on other regions,
focuses on the process of capital accumulation and economic
development within national boundaries. In this theory,
stress is applied to the institution of private property,
the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the growth of
different classes under capitalism, and the spread of
capitalism from its "heartland" in Europe (Warren 1980).
But one dictum lies at the core of this theory: "the country
that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less
developed, the image of its own future" (Marx 1967, vol. 1).
Countries are the basic units and laws and generalizations
drawn from the experience of presently affluent nations can
serve as a model for the present and the future of those
nations that are still poor.
World Political Econoay Theories
There are four major world political economy theories.
Each of these claims some sort of relationship to Marx or
the "Marxist tradition." The first of these, the Leninist,
is a source of the other three. It is represented today by
much "Trotskyist" literature and that tradition's stress on
the impossibility of "socialism in one country," given the
global nature of the capitalist economy (Mandel 1968).
Lenin's theory of development revolved around the idea,
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typically in slogan form, that "imperialism is the highest
stage of capitalism." Lenin saw imperialism under
capitalism as the extension of capitalism outside of its
historic core into the rest of the world. To stimulate
capital accumulation "at home," so to speak, capitalists
expended their operations into the rest of the world.
Capitalism thus became a global rather than a national
economic system and large parts of the world became
subservient to the interests and power of the "developed"
world from which capitalism emanated.
The "development-of-underdevelopment" and "world-
system" approaches are in many respects elaborations upon
the Leninist approach rather than entirely new formulations
(Brenner 1977, 104:25-91). The d e v e 1 o p m e n t - o f -
underdevelopment thesis draws largely upon Latin America
experience to argue that development in the West has
depended upon a systematic process of underdevelopment
elsewhere (Frank 1969). In the world-system approach this
thesis is founded on the proposition that the periphery of a
"modern world-system" that originated in the sixteenth
century has provided the resources for development of a
European-North Atlantic core (Wallerstein 1974). A long-
term dominance of this core over an expanding periphery has
arisen with the periphery dependent upon the core for
markets, investment, innovation and ideology.
The final world political economy theory is one that
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focuses on the role of the multinational corporations as a
source of political and economic control. From this
perspective, exemplified in the writing of Barnet and Muller
(1974), global patterns of development have come
increasingly to depend upon the activities of large
multinational corporations which view the world as one
economic unit.
Ecopolitical Economy Theories
The third type of theory, ecopolitical economy, is
based upon an attempt to understand the process of
development as economic growth yet place this in the context
that is sensitive to the costs as well as benefits of
economic growth and cultural change. The origins of this
perspective can be seen in the writings of anthropologists
on the cultural ecology of development (Geertz 1963), and in
a variety of findings of field research on the impact of
programs of agricultural innovation. The meaning of
development is central to this theory; in contrast to other
theories where it is taken for granted (Wallman 1977).
Typically, the insights of the world political economy
theories are joined with this critical perspective on the
value of economic growth.
Technology Transfer and Theories of Development
How does technology transfer fit with the various
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theories of development? As Table 2.2 indicates the
theories differ greatly in terms of perspective on
technology transfer. It should be noted that for some of
the development theories the specific perspective on
technology transfer, following from the assumptions and
emphases of the theory, is implicit rather than explicit.
Brown (1981, 10-11) discovered and juxtaposed rather
than invented the various perspectives.
Two general points are worth noting. First, the
modernization theories tend to have a more positive view of
technology transfer than do the other theories. This, of
course, is the point noted
, if not articulated clearly, by
the critics of "dif
f
usionism. " Creating mechanisms for the
supply of technology, developing infrastructure and/or
improving the spread of knowledge about technology are
thought to help development. Second, none of the theories
of development contains reference to the economic history
perspective on technology transfer. Yet it is the economic
history perspective that has generated the most empirical
research on technology transfer and pinpointed the specific
barriers to the easy transfer of technology from one setting
to another (Rosenberg 1970, 11:550-575; Hayami 1974,
34:131-148).
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Table 2.2
Technology Transfer and Theories of Development
Perspectives on Technology
Theory of Development Transfer
Stages of Growth Market and Infrastructure
Dual Economy Market and Infrastructure
Modernity Adoption
Institutional Reform Adoption
"Classic" Marxist Market and Infrastructure
Leninist Development
Development of Underdevelopment Development
World-System Development
Multinational Corporation Development
Ecopolitical Economy Development
One important difference within the group of
modernization theories is the difference between the
moderni ty /ins ti tut iona 1 reform theories and the others.
There has been a tendency to cluster modernization theories
together in discussions of innovation diffusion but it is
apparent that when regarded this way there are substantial
differences between them. Specifically, the modernity and
institutional reform theories focus on value change and
Westernization as instruments of development. Thus,
technology transfer will depend on r e c e p t i v e n e s s to
innovation. This corresponds most closely to the adoption
perspective on technology transfer.
The other modernization theories, however, even though
they rest on assumptions concerning value orientations, are
directed much more to the benefits that flow from the supply
of technology and infrastructure. Technologies can be
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imposed despite the initial attitude of the "natives."
Economic and political barriers, not social or cultural
ones, stand in the way of national development. Coercion or
"marketing," in the promotional and advertising sense of the
term, is the major mechanism for transformation.
The other theories incorporate a more negative
appraisal of technology transfer. Indeed, without exception
they subscribe to the "development" perspective on
technology transfer. Technology transfer is seen as
beneficial to suppliers rather than adopters. It is also
seen as "dependency creating." The technology in question
is often controlled from elsewhere, may have negative
effects in areas where it is introduced and may profit only
those who sponsored its introduction (Weinstein and Pillai
1979). Technology transfer also disrupts established and
perhaps satisfactory social and ecological patterns.
All types of theories of development, therefore,
contain positions on technology transfer. But it appears
that these positions are partial and incomplete. For
example, modernization theories have no place for evaluating
the consequences of technology transfer. World political
economy theories also have deficiencies. In particular,
they are usually silent on why patterns of control over
technologies and other resources must necessarily lead to
negative effects upon those to whom technologies are
transferred. Technology transfer is assumed to be negative
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in its effects without examining the specific situations in
which this might or might not be so.
The examination of technology transfer and, more
generally, innovation diffusion by students of "development"
has been restricted by the limited perspectives on
technology transfer contained within the various theories of
development they use. Some ways in which the
conceptualization of technology transfer can be improved
within all theories of development have been suggested
(Stewart 1977).
A first requirement is a clear articulation of the
relationship between development and technological change.
An obvious strength of the world political economy theories
is the critical political interpretation of technology
transfer that they offer. Technology is viewed not just as
technique but as contained within a web of constraining
political relationships. Ecopolitical economy theory goes
beyond this point to note, as well, the general ecological
and cultural consequences of technological change. This
theory opens to question whether "bigger is better" and
whether capital-intensive is always superior to labor-
intensive agriculture. These are the hidden assumptions of
modernization theories.
A second requirement is an examination of the political
and economic conditions under which technology transfer has
in the past led to economic growth. This is where the
31
economic history perspective comes into play. Economic
historians interested in technology transfer try to identify
the critical conditions under which technology transfer can
be successful. They focus on both local demands and
circumstances rather than engage in global generalizations.
Rosenberg (1972, 10:3-33), a leading advocate of this
viewpoint, summarizes as follows: "the productivity of
any technology is never independent of its institutional
context and therefore needs to be studied in that context."
Unfortunately, theories of development have rarely
incorporated this insight.
A third requirement involves the relative centrality of
technology within theories of development. Many theories
have regarded technology as secondary or even exogenous to
the process of development. Improving the treatment of
technology by incorporating notions of technical choice and
appropriate technology is a necessary pr e-requi si te for
improving the position of technology transfer in theories of
development.
A fourth requirement concerns the ideology of the
"technical imperative" and how it lays the groundwork for
accepting a "marketing" message and, ultimately, acquiring a
new technology.
A fifth requirement concerns the interaction between
the growth of a Western-style mass education system and the
type and rate of technology transfer. This relates to the
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previous point on the ideology of "developmentalism" but it
is a more specific aspect of it. Easterlin (1981, 41:1-19)
has argued that the "personal" element in technology
transfer - demonstration, training, personal contact-
presupposes a common intellectual and knowledge base and a
common educational process. This presupposes the
unimportance of economic and political barriers to growth
other than the educational system, largely ignores the
question of who benefits from growth and fails to address
the question of whether growth is always synonymous with
development.
In sum, there are several specific respects in which
all theories of development are deficient with regard to
their conceptualizing of technology transfer. Some theories
seem to be better able to incorporate all these aspects of
technology transfer than others. Even though open to a
variety of criticisms, the world political economy theories
and the ecopolitical economy theory provide a good base
through their focus on the global setting of technology
transfer and their historical orientation toward
understanding development.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DYNAMICS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
All human societies display an "existence rationality"
(Walshok 1971, 13:451-472). Whatever may be their
information-processing capacities and effective access to
resources, all human groups devise concrete strategies which
enable them to survive, to protect their identity and
dignity, and to assert whatever freedoms they can muster
over nature, over enemies, and over destructive social
forces at work within their own boundaries. These
strategies, taken as wholes, constitute their "existence
rationality .
"
The global diffusion of modern technology has tended to
standardize the "existence rationality" of all societies
around specifically Western notions of efficiency and
productivity, rationality, and problem-solving. Thus in
societies which are modernizing, not only factories but also
the technological approach to life itself gradually come to
be viewed as normal. Yet both factories and technology
remain alien to experiential landscapes in non-modern
settings
.
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Technological innovators do not intend, of course, to
destroy pre-existing values; their overt aim is merely to
solve problem more efficiently, to produce goods or provide
services according to different standards of quantity and
quality than previously. Nevertheless, simply by acting as
innovators, they cannot avoid tampering with prior values.
Moreover, they shatter the fragile web which binds all the
values of pre-modern communities into a meaningful whole.
The Technological Imperative
An inner force drives technology to render actual
everything which is possible: this is the redoubtable
"technological imperative" (Ellul 1965). The problem is
general: means tend to ursup the place of ends: processes
express their own dynamisms apart from goals they are meant
to serve. Providing that any idea can be translated into an
artifact constitutes for technologists a challenge they find
irresistible. Momentum builds up within research
institutions for them to do something mainly to prove that
it is possible. And much irresponsible technological
tinkering is encouraged by the benevolent attitude toward
change which prevails in "developed" societies, whose
general bias favors the view that what is "new" is
necessarily better. Technological researchers embrace this
bias - and are rewarded by society for their efforts. This
bias gives them a vested interest in perpetuating the
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"technological imperative," that is, the tendency of
technology to impose itself independently of larger
purposes.
Technology is itself a rapidly evolving system
operating within larger systems also undergoing dynamic
transformation. Some development writings imply that
science and technology are the common patrimony of mankind
and that the "Third World" enjoys advantages in being a
latecomer on the scene of technological modernization. The
Third World, we have been told, can take technological
shortcuts. Yet technology is not a free good, but an
economic one, sold dearly to those who can pay for it, not
to those who may need it most (Ritchie-Calder 1973, 11).
Technology may be the most vital of economic goods
because it can generate new wealth faster than other
productive assets - capital, labor, natural resources, etc.
Unless exchanges are subsidized, technology must be paid for
by buyer. The proper arena for its circulation is some
local, regional, national, transnational, or global market.
Although much of it is proprietary knowledge, technology
tends to circulate faster and easier than most other capital
goods, indeed, than many consumer goods themselves. This
greater mobility is explained by the relatively intangible
nature even of technologies which are incorporated in a
"package" of goods or services. What is worth nothing here
is that technology circulates, if at all, within arenas of
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economic competition in the production and provision of
goods, products, and services. Thus is technology caught up
in the dynamics of competition.
Competition
Competition is fueled by incentive structures which
reward those who are the first at meeting effective
purchasing power and its equivalents. Goods are produced
and supplied by various enterprises - private, public, or
mixed. Their supply role is meaningless, however, unless
matched by a vigorously exercised parallel demand function.
Whether producers are decisively stimulated by the lure of
monies held by purchasers or by the rewards that come from
those who wield effective power to set targets, competition
remains the basic ground rule of economic activity.
Within capitalism, competition as response to effective
buying power enjoys priority as the motor force of
mobilization for production. Under socialism, on the other
hand, competition responds to motivations based on
political, ideological, and bureaucratic interests. Even
state-owned enterprises must compete among themselves to be
awarded contracts, to gain access to sources of material
inputs indispensable to production, and to meet targeted
quotas in time to avoid punitive measures. Under both
systems, it is competition in the arena of production which
dictates the behavior of individual production units, even
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though these units respond to diverse stimulus which play
the role of inducing and rewarding production in a
competitive mode. In other words, in uncontrolled classical
free markets, the "competitive edge" is essential to the
survival and prosperity of enterprises. In controlled
markets (monopoly situations), although the competitive edge
is relatively less crucial on purely economic grounds,
external considerations dictate some degree of
competitiveness. What results is a universalized drive
to "keep oneself competitive" by keeping abreast of
technological innovations.
Sequence of Dependency and Capital Investment
Technology is correctly viewed as a universe because it
is a system of its own whose field of influence is the
entire globe. Transnational corporations, within this
framework, understand that a competitive edge which has been
lost or diluted in "mature" markets can be regained in less
mature ones. The history of transnational corporations
investment attests to the profitability of technologies and
derived products in Third World sites long after the
competitive edge, or even basic marketability, has been lost
in original industrial sites.
Transnational corporations marketing practices suggest
an interesting gloss on the basic theses of Latin America
dependency theorists (Bonilla 1973). This added dimension
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is called the "sequence of dependency." The sequence is
initiated when the dependency of purchasers is expressed in
their need for a varying spectrum of goods provided by
outside sellers. Initially, public and private firms in
less-developed countries depend on outside suppliers for
capital. This need leads them to offer inducements to
direct investment and other forms of supplying capital, such
as loans or grants. After pressing capital needs have been
met, however, or at least mitigated, the most pressing
demand felt in underdeveloped economies is to import
technology. Once again, varied incentives are held out to
those who can satisfy this demand.
Managerial Expertise
Many firms whose capital or technology is no longer
sought or welcomed are courted for their managerial
expertise. In one sense, managerial expertise is simply a
particular intangible kind of decisional technology, special
in that it can be gained only after long years of experience
(Rosenberg and Hageboeck 1973). Thus a firm lacking
managerial expertise can acquire it only by an ongoing
transfer process which must be contractually negotiated.
Access to Markets
The final component, after capital, technology, and
managerial expertise, have been obtained by less-developed
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purchasers, is access to markets. Prerequisites of access
are an existing network of contacts, specialized legal and
bureaucratic skills, and rapid information-processing
abilities without which final products would not move fast
enough or far enough to amortize the high production-input
costs of capital, technology, and managerial expertise.
Again is illustrated how tightly technology is bound to the
dynamics of competition.
Values. Development Strategies, and Technology Policy
Technology is both a system of its own and a component
of larger social systems. Within this framework, it becomes
important to analyze its workings alternatively probing
technology's inner dynamics and its links to broader social
processes. It is particularly useful to see the link which
binds society's basic value options to its preferred
development strategies and to its technology policy.
Specialists usually discuss development strategies in
terms of relative priorities: investment in industry over
agriculture, in human resources over infrastructure, tax
incentives to foreign firms over increased credit to native
firms, and so on. Even though planners rarely consider
explicitly the nexus between values and strategic
priorities, its existence is undeniable. Therefore if one
adheres to the value of greater ega li tar iani sm , one will
tend to favor improvements in agriculture over industry,
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small technology over mass-scale techniques, subsidies to
local firms over "tax holidays" to transnational
corporations, and popular decision-making over exclusive
reliance on experts. The same interdependence between
strategy and values exists at the level of ideology. If one
chooses capitalism, with its implied effort to integrate
into the world market, values such as self-reliance and
local innovation are relegated to the background. If,
conversely, one adopts a socialist strategy of development,
one will prefer gains in economic independence to pure
efficiency and one will attach greater weight to social
justice through land reform, for example, than increased
output. In other words, value choices and development
strategies are intimately linked. And when technology
policy is introduced into this equation, the nexus tightens
still more.
Many na t iona 1- technol ogy policy-makers appear not to
notice this link; yet no technology policy can succeed if it
is not expressly designed to reinforce the social values
pursued, in some scale of priorities, by the development
strategy adopted. To illustrate, if Tanzania's commitment
to self-reliant development, which builds on the communal
values of its largely rural communities, is a serious
objective, one would expect its technology policy to assign
a wide role to "soft" technologies aimed at increasing
productivity through optimal use of local resources. Or, as
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one reflects on Algeria's declared goal of achieving the
full range of industrial capacity for internal and export
markets, different technological measures recommend
themselves. Among these are: importing foreign technologies
to build up competitive capabilities, training nationals in
order to limit dependency to the briefest possible period,
and achieving a coordinated bargaining posture so as to
avoid outside exploitation.
The question in this chapter has been whether
qualitative improvement can somehow replace quantitative
growth as the driving force of the evolutionary dynamism of
technology. This mutability of technology thus has been
placed in the context of economic competition, a major
stimulus to social change, and within the so-called
"sequence of dependency," which less-developed nations might
envisage breaking by progressively reducing their reliance
on outsiders for capital at a first stage, then technology,
later managerial expertise, and finally, access to markets.
A further dimension of this technological dynamism
constitutes its vital connection to broad value choices
constantly being made within changing societies and to
preferred development strategies.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IHSTITOTIONAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Strong social aspirations and political sentiments are
attached to the subject of the transfer of technology, as is
evident from the type of technology claimed, and as has been
repeatedly emphasized by the spokesmen of the developing
countries themselves.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe methods
of transfer of technology in use, their advantages and the
political objections which have been raised to them. To
entirely disregard these political issues in the present
study would be an omission. Within this context, also
discussed are some social and political implications of the
transfer of technology to developing countries.
The reader may keep in mind that this report is an
attempt to judge in what ways the technological aspirations
of the developing countries of Latin America can be
satisfied and how specific methods can be adopted for this
purpose in the future. It must be borne in mind that the
intensive documentation already accorded to this subject in
no way diminishes the need for rational thinking in the
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future. The advance of technological and therefore economic
capacity in developing countries is essential to the relief
of hardship and social distress in those countries. It is
also vital to the future growth of the developed world.
Existing Methods of Transfer of Technology
The Private Sector
International direct investment, i.e. the transfer of
productive capital from one country to another, has been a
major vehicle for the transfer of technology (Frost 1978,
2). The mechanisms for the transfer of these various
knowledge components include direct investment by foreign
companies; licensing agreements, where a developing country
firm obtains machinery and technology from a foreign firm;
management-consultancy agreements, where the developing
country requires managerial skills; technical-assistance
agreements; industrial cooperation, and so on. In the case
of direct investment, the technology package comes more or
less complete. The other arrangements involve taking the
package apart, and attempting to "de-package" or
"re-package" according to particular needs ( U.S. Department
of State 1979).
Direct Investment
The essential function of international direct
investment is to transfer capital between countries for the
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purpose of creating new commercial or industrial facilities
in the recipient country. These facilities may be purely
for the purpose of marketing, and may consist simply of the
provision of storage sites, offices and selling points; for
the pursuit of service activities, such as communications,
transport and financial or professional vocations; but they
are most generally for the pursuit of manufacturing, mining
and plantations. The motive for international direct
investment appears to be primarily to provide, through
local rather than distant home production, fuller coverage
of local markets; second, to take advantage of local labor
and material supplies; and third, in the case of mining and
plantations activities, to supply capital in the only areas
where the natural resources occur (U.S. Agency for
International Development 1977).
International investment has, for decades, played an
important role in the world economic development, except in
Europe, where capital accumulation necessarily had to be
self-generating and slow. Many Latin American countries
including Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, have received
substantial capital contributions from economies that had
developed earlier. The general effect has been to permit
capital to accumulate in those countries at faster rates
than would otherwise have been possible.
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The International Coapany
The international transfer of capital for industrial
and commercial processes is necessarily the work of
companies within the private producing sector of the
economy. Such companies have been active throughout modern
economic history.
International direct investment installs, in the host
country, new plants, factories, warehouses, offices and
marketing organizations. In the case of manufacture, the
investing company will broadly duplicate in the host country
the output already established in the host country. In the
case of mines and plantations, the investing companies will
duplicate techniques perfected in other areas where similar
deposits exist, or where similar plant life can be
sustained. Where the natural resources are unique to the
area concerned, the investing company will attempt to devise
optimum techniques of output (Seneveratne 1979).
The new enterprise set up in the host country will, if
successful, develop in size and complexity and in
self-generated financial resources. This will call for the
implantation of supervisory, administrative, executive,
financial, accounting, legal and ancillary expertise. As
the new enterprise begins to develop its chosen market, it
will find itself obliged fairly quickly to set in place the
necessary commercial organization. It will require a sales
force under a sales manager or sales director; it will
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require storage facilities, supervised by staff conversant
with stock intake, storage, control, audit, and dispatch
problems; it will require specialists in the sphere of
transport and communications. The new enterprise will need,
in addition, market research, alone with analysts,
linguists, economists and consultants.
Transfer of Technology
The central decision to create a commercial and
industrial entity in a host country implies the application
of the scientific, technical, industrial, administrative,
financial and marketing knowledge, without which the new
enterprise cannot function. These various forms of
knowledge constitute the "package" normally subsumed under
the term "transfer of technology." The acquisition of this
knowledge would, in the ordinary course of events, be costly
for the area concerned, involving considerable expenditure
on general and advanced educational facilities, on
specialist scientific and technical training, on engineering
and process-operation instruction, and on training in
commercial, financial, accounting and other business
procedures. However, the nature of international direct
investment is such that the cost of acquiring such knowledge
is self-financing. This is to say that the knowledge
concerned is transmitted as a result of the provision by the
parent company of the appropriate machinery, operating
instructions, qualified staff and management cadres. The
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cost of these, in the form of royalties, fees and salaries
constitute operating costs against the trading revenues of
the new enterprise. The total operating costs of the
enterprise - which will also include wages, materials and
standing charges - will, in the early stages of its life,
normally exceed trading revenues. The resultant deficits
will be met by capital inputs from the parent (these
are, in the early life of a subsidiary, usually large). If
the enterprise progresses satisfactorily, however, its
trading revenues will begin to match its operating costs and
so cover the cost of technological acquisitions; more
generally, if the enterprise is successful then revenues
will exceed costs and a stream of profits will ensue. This
will generate a positive cash flow, with the result that the
subsidiary will itself begin to generate internal sources of
funds, and will itself become a wealth-producing entity
(Seneveratne 1979).
It has been noted above that the successful new
enterprise will generate internal resources in increasing
measure, which themselves constitute new production of
wealth. The effect of this on the general educational and
technological level of the host country can be gauged if the
universe of international company subsidiaries established
in a particular country can be visualized. These
enterprises, taken as a whole, will form a substantial
source of new GDP (Gross Domestic Product); that is to say,
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they will raise the level of overall demand, and will
raise the general standard of living of the country in
question. This will stimulate both new forms of enterprise,
new requirements for technological qualifications, and new
resources for financing the acquisition of these
qualifications .
The Public Sector
Besides the flows of private direct investment from the
developed world to developing nations, a roughly equivalent
amount is channelled through a variety of official aid
programs, including one dealing specifically with technical
assistance
.
Technical Content of Official Aid
The bulk of official aid expenditure is on people, and
on informational and research institutions. To the extent
that the transfer of technology takes place through people,
this disbursement enables foreign nationals to pass on
knowledge while working in developing countries.
Apart from technical knowledge transferred by means of
official grants to support people, an informal transfer of
technology is effected through grants, surveys, etc.,
financed by other official aid. For instance, a grant to
help devise and build a hydroelectric scheme necessarily
involves the import of machinery into the host country; this
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will require operating and servicing by local technicians.
At the same time, engineers and other technically qualified
people who work alongside local personnel will inevitably
impart their knowledge. So this type of unrecorded transfer
must be added to transfers which take place through normal
trade and investment channels (The Development Coordination
Committee 1978).
Official aid enables technical knowledge to be
transferred to host countries essentially through the
transfer of qualified personnel to work with local people.
How effectively this knowledge is absorbed and used is
difficult to measure. This subject will be explored when
some of the problems encountered with the existing methods
of transferring technology be considered.
Problems Encountered with the Methods of
Transfer of Technology
International private investment has encountered
opposition in many Latin American countries during recent
years. Disaffection with what were categorized as "the
restrictive business practice" of some international
companies led to active government intervention in
individual countries. In a number of countries strict codes
have been introduced to define the economic sectors in which
international investment could take place, and attaching to
this investment detailed conditions on such matters as
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levels of employment, imports and exports, capital
expenditure, local financing, profit remittances, royalty
and management fee payments, local equity participation
and transfers of capital from and to the parent company.
Recently, many developing countries embarked on a policy of
progressive nationalization of foreign enterprises; the
terms under which the value of these enterprises was
reimbursed were often held to be unsatisfactory by the
original owners. In addition, a number of countries adopted
policies of progressively appropriating existing foreign
enterprises and excluding new entrants. Other countries,
among them Nigeria and Iran, sought to bring about early
transfer of effective ownership through compulsory allotment
of equity participation to local residents. These various
policies and regulations were pursued in varying degrees
over the years, and frequently with large and unforeseen
changes of aims and requirement (Germidis 1977).
Objections to International Investment
The objections to international investment raised by
Latin American countries may be broadly characterized as
political, in the sense that they refer to the national
interest of the particular country, as conceived by the
government of the day.
Financing ;
Deve lopi ng-count r y governments are keenly aware that
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the central financial operation of international companies
lies in a flow of capital from the parent company to the
subsidiary and a return of flow of dividends and interest
from the subsidiary to the parent. Given that in any
company, whether international or other, the input of
external capital cannot, over a protracted period, exceed or
indeed equal the profit arising, if the enterprise is to be
financially viable. In the case of any individual
international company the outflows of dividends and interest
will in the medium to longer term exceed the inflow of
capital from the parent. Only a proportion of dividends and
interest due to the parent will in fact be remitted, the
remainder being withheld inside the subsidiary for its
future use. The flows visible to the developing country,
however, will be those actually across the exchanges.
Moreover, the books of the subsidiary will show the
retained profits as capital accretions in the name of the
parent. In the universe of multinational corporations
operating in any given developing country there will be,
assuming expansion of activity in that locality, a
continuing stream of new capital for new enterprises, which
will offset the capital/profit imbalance referred above.
However, where foreign investment is in fact declining, this
will not occur. A decline in new investment streams has
been the case in many developing countries (Stopford
and Wells 1972).
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An allied consideration is the possibility, at least in
principle, of the covert transfer of profits in other
guises, notably in the form of enlarged royalty and
management fee payments, and through the medium of transfer
pricing; this last entails the overcharging of materials
supplied to the subsidiary by the parent and the
underpricing of products sent from the subsidiary to the
parent, the effect being a transfer of income from the
subsidiary to the parent.
National Jurisdiction :
A broader class of objections resides in the
proposition that multinational corporations are able to
escape the jurisdiction of the host-country government. In
an immediate way, this will clearly arise from the
t r a ns f e r
-
p r i c i n g referred to above, in that the
multinational corporations, in as much as they do not have
the long-term interest of the developing country at heart,
are able and willing to transfer their production facilities
elsewhere if greater advantages present themselves in other
countries
.
Cost of Technology ;
In a domain more specific to the question of the
transfer of technology, developing countries' governments
have objected to the established system of industrial
property rights, including particularly patent licenses and
royalty payments. It has been felt that the economies of
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the various developing countries, which have been unable to
develop technology of this sort for themselves, have been
unjustly burdened with the cost of using industrialized
countries' technology and that this knowledge should be
freely shared. In the same line of thinking, developing
countries have taken some exception to the practice of
parent companies charging royalties and fees to subsidiaries
for the use of patents owned by the parent, in order to
defray its development costs.
Balance of Payments :
Other objections by developing countries have related
to the balance of payments. It has been felt that
multinational corporations burden the external account of
countries not only in inducing a stream of profits in excess
of incoming capital, but in generating new categories of
imports, in the form of material for use in production; in
not exporting at a desirable level, owing perhaps to
regional marketing arrangements; and in moving short-term
funds in order to profit from changes in the value of
currency
.
The Political and Social Context
It is perhaps significant that the preferred phrase has
been "transfer of Technology" rather than, for example, "the
advancement of technology in developing countries." The
choice of the term clearly reflects: (a) the view that the
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technology is a concrete possession which can be passed on;
and (b) that in their technology the developed countries
have an acquisition which has been denied to the developing
countries and which should be restored to them.
The sense of past deprivation and the wish to emulate
are accompaniments of the political awakening of nations
that have gained political independence comparatively
recently, in the case of the African continent. However, it
would be unfortunate if such a sentiment were allowed to
color current attitudes. The stress for the future might
more suitably be placed, not on ways in which developed
countries should "hand over" technology to developing
countries, but on ways in which both parties can cooperate
to engender the fastest possible growth of technological
capacity within developing countries.
Private Enterprise and State Ethics
The choice of the phrase "transfer of technology"
reflects a further basic sentiment within developing
countries. This is, that the possession of technology
should not be a matter of commercial advantage but that, in
the name of social justice, it should be made generally
available to all who need it.
This reflection stems from a view of economic society
more akin to state-socialist principles perhaps, than to the
private-enterprise concepts that prevail in the Western
55
democracies and Japan. In these countries it is widely
believed that social justice cannot be achieved through the
state ownership of property and that, while all individuals
are equal at law and in opportunity, they must necessarily
be unequal in attainment. Their governments, accordingly,
foster private enterprise, profits and competitive markets.
It is useless to call upon these governments, and still
less private enterprise, to provide free access to patents
and technological expertise, and to repudiate the laws of
property upon which their industrial democracy is founded.
In another respect, attitudes occasionally manifested
in developing countries, whether or not correct in
themselves, may handicap them in the search for technology
logical advancement. A distaste for the circumstances of
industrialization, and a preference for the contemplative,
or indeed the quietest, life, is implicit in the society of
some developing countries. A community must be free to
choose either way of life; the choice has been made, with
greater or lesser difficulty, in countries now
industrialized
.
However, a country cannot at the same time seek
technological and therefore industrial progress, while
preferring the virtues of a non-industrialized community.
It cannot, for example, encourage 95 per cent of its
university students to study sociology, the arts, and
philosophy, and only 5 per cent to study science. Countries
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seeking material progress must clearly create a social and
intellectual context within which industry can flourish.
A clear evidence of the above attitudes is represented
by the private business sector in many Latin American
countries. This sector has often been discouraged because
of governments' distaste for the entrepreneurial spirit.
These attitudes are difficult to reconcile with a desire for
technological advancement. It is difficult to seek the aid
and sympathy of countries wedded to the entrepreneurial
motive, while discouraging this motive at home.
The Politicization of the Problem of Technology
It has already been observed that the demand for
industrial and technical equality with the developed nations
originated, at least in part, in the immediate post-colonial
climate of political opinion prevalent in developing
countries. There is evidence that the issue has remained
highly political.
Industrial and technological equality has become a
major part of the foreign policy of developing countries and
of their representative organizations. Affirmation or
rejection of the industrial and technological theses of
developing countries has become in many ways a test not of
technical wisdom, but of political prestige.
Similarly, within the confines of many developing
countries the intellect and vigor of young students has been
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drawn, not to the research and analysis of scientific and
technical problems, but to theories of economic growth in
emulation of developed countries, and to the construction of
studies illustrating the moral liability of developed
countries, or the entitlement of developing countries.
These diplomatic and academic activities have merit and
are not wasted; however, there is a danger that they will be
overshadow the need for more concrete thinking and effort.
The danger is that the focus of action will be transferred
to these areas, from the milieu in which it should be
centred: that of industry and production.
In the final analysis, the developing countries will
not achieve self-development and attain real independence in
a perspective of international scientific collaboration
unless they are themselves active agents of their own
transformation through their own knowledge and with the
active support of the developed regions of the world. The
real battle for development, therefore, is fought by the
nationals of developing countries under their own
constraints with their own resources.
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PART II
THE NEED FOR TECHNOLOGY PLANNING
After exploring the background of technology and the
ways in which technology circulates from rich to poor
societies, this report now inquires into some questions of
technology policy for development.
Technology policy embraces a vast network of domains
relating to a nation's scientific and technical pool,
material and financial infrastructure, overall incentive
system, attitude toward outside agents, degree of control
over the direction and speed of planned social change, level
of integration into global or regional economies, and
relative priorities attaching to technological modernity
itself
.
Many Latin American countries now recognize that these
burdens imposed by the transfer process abound because they
lack a well-articulated technology policy which links
development objectives to the dynamics of technological
innovation and to prevailing patterns of transfer.
Technological policy-makers in Latin America must
reflect critically on the principles underlying development
strategies, that is, on the basic value options of their
respective societies.
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CHAPTER 5
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND PUBLIC POLICY
Technology is "a powerful means of international
policy: it serves as a new means of projecting national
influence and power into the international arena" (Hetman
1973, 31). The 1972 Organization of American States meeting
of Latin American governments in Brasilia (OAS 1972, 10-11)
declared that
science and technology offer infinite possibilities for
providing the people with the well-being that they
seek. But in Latin American countries the
potentialities that this wealth of the modern world
offers have by no means been realized to the degree
and extent necessary.
This chapter explores policies consonants with the
aspiration of many Latin American countries to acquire
greater technological maturity, viability, and autonomy.
Basic Options in Development
All efforts at diagnosis and prescription center on
value judgments about what constitutes a good, or a better,
human society is. For some a better society is one in which
greater access to opportunity, if not to more tangible
benefits, is created; for others the goal is effective
equality in modes of greater or lesser participation; for
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still others the basic aim is to assure the planetary
survival in modes which salvage human liberties. The three
images are not mutually exclusive, nor are they always found
in their pure state.
More crucial than the ideology it espouses, however, is
whether a society conceives of development merely as the
pursuit of certain benefits or as the quest of these
benefits in a certain mode. How benefits are obtained is as
essential to defining development as the fact that they are
obtained. This is not to underestimate the importance of
benefits sought - greater material welfare, higher
production and productivity, more efficient institutions,
the growing ability to sustain dynamic economic performance.
Yet it matters enormously how these gains are obtained: in a
pattern of high, or of low, dependency on outside powers; in
a equitable distributional mode or in ways which enhance the
privileges of favored minorities to the detriment of needier
masses; in a paternalistic, impositional style or in ways
which progressively empower the people to choose its targets
and the instruments to reach them. All these values
refer to the mode of change, not primarily to its targeted
content
.
The relevant point in this section of the study is that
varying images point to diverse policies indicating how
developmental benefits will be sought. Table 5.1 shows some
of the central questions affecting the desired mode of
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development
.
Table 5.1
Central Questions Affecting the Mode of Development (Ferkiss
1974).
- Which institutional arrangements best promote development
goals (politically centralized or decentralized, degree of
coercion in planning, etc.)?
- What relative roles are to be assigned to political
leaders, experts, technicians, and "the people?" This
decision affects the degree of elitism or technocracy of
the development effort.
- Which social classes or interest groups will be made to
bear the costs of change, and how will relative burdens be
assigned?
- Which time spans are to be deemed tolerable before
targeted gains are effectively reached?
- What degree of coercion from above will be judged
acceptable?
- What measure of self-reliance or dependence on the outside
is permitted or encouraged?
- Is priority given to material or to moral incentives? Or
a mixture of both?
The answers to these questions form a systematic whole
which constitutes, in effect, a society's development
strategy. Even thought decisions taken on all points are
important, it is particularly essential to focus on a few of
them. These are now discussed below.
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The Contact with the Outside World
No Third World nation can successfully pursue a fully
independent course. Nevertheless, important differences of
degree are discernible among nations; some are more highly
integrated with outside systems than others. At times,
links are one-sided, as in the case of Cuba and its ties
with the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist
nations. Algeria, on the contrary, provides an example of
wide diversification in its linkages with other countries
and regions. In Brazil, the primary integration seen is
with the international market, not with a single nation or
region. Preferences as to kind, degree, and locus of
integration constitute a strategic development option
fraught with consequences for technology policy. Indeed
one major thesis presented by Latin American dependency
theorists (Bonilla 1973) states that domestic constraints on
successful development are mainly due to structures of
dependency imposed by outside forces which operate in
symbiosis with interest groups representing the social
forces of "internal colonialism" (Gonzalez-Casanova 1969,
118-139). Whether one accepts or rejects these views, they
correctly note how decisive for development strategies are
decisions about degrees of integration with outside systems.
It is no accident, therefore, that the "Brazilian model" of
development imposed by the military government since 1964
has profoundly affected the kinds of technologies adopted,
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the allotment of social costs in the country, and the
relative neglect of all but large-scale agriculture
sub-sectors (Furtado 1972, 1-127). Once Brazil's planners
decided to compete in the world market on the market's
own terms, they were automatically giving direction to their
strategy on other fronts and foreclosing alternative
options
.
By striving to achieve competitiveness in world
markets, a nation commits itself to certain industrial
priorities or to large-scale industrialized agriculture over
and against other alternatives, to certain patterns of
consumer-goods production favoring the privileged classes,
to supplying export needs over meeting internal demands, and
to other policies having greater or lesser impact on
technological choices. Therefore, whenever a national
development plan in some Third World country requires
a high degree of integration with the regional export
market, a whole amount of supportive infrastructure
investments is implied rendered necessary so as to assure
competitive efficiency. Choosing integration implies
selecting technology which is capital-intensive and of
standardized international quality. It also means plant
scales opposed to the requirements of small and medium
industry as well as an agricultural sector to the detriment
of the poorest and least productive. Implied also are
an employment policy which provides training and subsidies
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to small numbers of skilled and professional personnel, and
monetary and fiscal policies ill-suited to produce equitable
redistribution inasmuch as subsidies favor efficient export
sectors. For these reasons developmental efforts aimed at
integration to big powers or to the world market set limits
to strategies which can effectively be adopted.
The Strategies of Autonomy and Self-Reliance
Tanzania holds pride of place among nations advocating
self-reliance as a development strategy. One constant
principle in the thought of President Julius Nyerere is that
"there is no model for us to copy" (Nyerere 1968, 19-20).
He writes that
in 1965 Tanzania adopted its own form of democracy - we
rejected the Western model and said it was not
appropriate for our circumstances despite the fact
that all our constitutional development had until then
been based on i t . .
.
When we introduced this new system, we were criticized
for abandoning democracy... In response to this
criticism we tried to explain what we were trying to
do and why we thought our new system was both
democratic and suitable for our conditions. But
having done that we did not worry about what the
Western countries said or what democratic theorists
said. For in rejecting the idea that we had to
follow the Westminster model if we wanted to be
democratic, we had also overcome the psychological
need to have a certificate of approval from the
West in relation to our political system.
What Nyerere claims for a political system - freedom
from servility to previously existing models - he likewise
urges upon his nation in its approach to economic problems:
We have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out
of our own roots, but in a particular direction and
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towards a particular kind of objective. We are
doing this by emphasizing certain characteristics
of our traditional organization, and extending them so
that they can embrace the possibilities of modern
technology and enables us to meet the challenge of
life in the twentieth century world (Nyerere 1968, 2).
The economy must be organized so as to free people from
manipulation by the market; "the first priority of
production must be the manufacture and distribution of such
goods as will allow every member of society to have
sufficient food, clothing and shelter, to sustain a decent
life (Nyerere 1968, 11). This is the heart of
self-reliance: the commitment to creative innovation and
adaptation in the light of local constraints, values,
priorities, and heritage. Any nation pursuing a
self-reliant strategy of development must institutionalize
its critique of prevailing as much as possible outside
models. It must also adopt criteria for choosing
technologies and modes of their utilization drawn from
outside the technological market place. In this analysis,
foreign technologies are not excluded on principle, but
imported will be only those types of technology which foster
locally defined goals.
China serves as an exceptional example of a nation
adopting a developmental strategy which emphasizes
self-reliance not only at the national level but also within
regional, local, and productive-unit levels. The Lagos
Plan of Action (LPA) in Africa, on the other hand, offers
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an excellent model. This plan emerged at a time of
discouraging economic trends: 20 years of stagnation in
outputs; deteriorating terms of trade; increased payments
for the import of high level skills, capital goods, and
spare parts; and increased unemployment and poverty (OAU,
ECA
,
ADB 1982:3). It assumes that the past and current
policies were not adequate to successfully address the
present economic problems. Thus the LPA was designed to
restructure the economy of Africa, based on the twin
principles of national and collective self-reliant and
self-sustaining development (OAU, ECA, ADB 1982:3). As a
corrective measure, the LPA proposed that individual
governments involve youth in agricultural development in
order to arrest the rural-urban drift, create effective
incentives in the agricultural sector, and establish joint
efforts to deal with such regional agricultural problems as
pest control and seed selection. Nevertheless, even
self-reliance cannot be an absolute principle, and it
must not be interpreted to mean excluding outside
influences. Moreover, even where national planners do not
choose self-reliance as their primary policy, it is possible
within limited sectors such as agriculture or housing to
champion a self-reliant approach which will have important
implications on choices and modes of technology. Similarly,
if planners take as a basic strategy a serious attack
on mass poverty and unemployment, a strong orientation will
67
exist in favor of lesser integration with international
markets and greater local iventiveness to correct factor
distortions inherent in imported technologies. In every
case there are limits beyond which neither efficiency nor
equity can be ignored. Yet on balance, a basic option on
the scale of degrees of integration and self-reliance is the
central point within which technology policies can be
evaluated. Because reality imposes compromises, no
country's plan is fully consistent with its basic options,
and unexpected events can suddenly make self-reliant nations
more "integrated" with the outside than formerly was the
case. Nonetheless, any nation's decision-makers will
ultimately have to place primarily importance either to
integration or to self-reliance. The degree to which they
will blend the two will depend on the so-called incentive
systems at work in their societies.
Incentive Systems
The market is a vigorous mechanism for motivating
people to produce, sell, buy, and consume. It assumes the
existence of a shared incentive system around which buyers
and sellers see comparative and mutual advantages in playing
their roles. The existence of effective purchasing power in
the hands of a pool of prospective buyers is the incentive
leading producers and consumers alike to engage in the
processes of generating supply and demand. The market
68
undoubtedly needs various subordinate mechanisms to work
such as price, competition, and demand stimulation (Wallich
1973, 62). It must not be supposed, however, that societies
organized around other basic incentive systems can dispense
with markets. On the contrary, even socialist societies
rely on markets. But instead of serving as the organizing
principle of economic life, the market in these societies
acts as a regulatory mechanism to control against waste,
duplication, and o v e r c en t r a 1 i za t i o n . The market is
subordinated to a plan relying on persuasion, some consensus
about priority needs, or a mobilization around collective
moral incentives (Mannheim 1951, 191). Within this context
competition is not eliminated but takes on secondary
importance: It is not the dynamic motor of effort; it merely
stimulates and channels effort, usually under the rubric of
"socialist emulation" and in support of targets set by some
plan (Mannheim 1951, 193).
A very striking testimony in the subject comes from
Carl A. Gerstacker, chairman of the Dow Chemical Company
(Barnet and Muller 1974, 55): "It is in reality the profit
motive that makes industry responsive to social needs.
Therefore, once it becomes profitable to be just, managers
moved by material incentives will respond." Clearly
governments may act as intermediaries between profit-makers
and needly consumers lacking buying power. Yet even
equitable social-welfare policies must overcome the dominant
69
influence exercised on sectoral policy by the basic
incentive systems. Not surprisingly, powerless needy groups
are neglected while potentially dangerous ones are appeased.
The perdurabili ty , within industrial countries, not only of
"pockets of poverty" but also of several social groups "left
out" of the benefits of development suggests that
governmental correctives to the profit incentive factor
cannot abolish mass misery.
No development strategy can avoid making a basic
choice: either to develop for the benefit of those who are
already privileged or to embrace a pattern of development
aimed at abolishing misery for all citizens and to create an
incentive system capable of institutionalizing this
priority .
National-development planners who initially opt in
favor of achieving industrial capacity, both for a domestic
and for foreign markets, cannot avoid a high degree of
dependency on outside suppliers of technology. Some
countries, such as Brazil, view this dependency as only
temporary; they express confidence in their ability to
import technology on a large scale and from diversified
sources for a limited number of years and, in a second
phase, to gain a relative degree of autonomy. Only the time
will reveal whether their optimistic expectations are
realistic or not. Under favorable circumstances, perhaps a
few Third World nations can acquire relative technological
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autonomy from outside sources, but in order to do so these
nations must enter the competitive arena of technology. In
short, gaining technological competitiveness is not
synonymous with gaining technological freedom. The freedom
in question is that of exploring technologies better adapted
to local needs and of creating conditions which allow a
society to control, at least relatively, the speed and
direction of technical change. However, not every country
with a small market can be self-sufficient even in the
production of modest consumer goods. Moreover, countries
with a dearth of resources will need advanced technology in
certain domains; they need a judicious choice of many
technologies. Therefore, even a sound austerity policy
cannot be applied absolutely. Nor need it exclude the
selective importation of modern technology, provided this
activity is subordinated to larger goals. The powerful
stimulus of competition will not then be abandoned but
subordinated to deeper values, equity, control and balance.
Concerted Action
A Latin American partnership is very much needed to
gain bargaining power in purchasing foreign technology.
Latin American nations need science and technology because
the two are "among the crucial tools necessary for
increasing national independence and welfare" (Seidel 1974,
ix). But neither independence nor welfare can be obtained
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by the developing countries if they act alone. Political
leaders in Latin America must perceive technological
cooperation as useful and indispensable. Cooperation in
technology means creating horizontal relationships to
replace the vertical ones with current suppliers which now
prevail, thanks to the ne a r -m o n o p o 1 y industrialized
countries have over technological innovation. As Raul
Prebisch urges in his book Change and Development, Latin
America's Great Task (Prebisch 1970, 5), the Third World
quest for a new international economic order may well remain
a dead letter unless cooperative efforts are made to
"horizontalize" their technological relationships.
Some writers urge establishing regional or
international public institutions for industrial research
and development (National Academy of Sciences 1973).
However, even within the Andean Pact, where broad agreement
exists on economic and industrial policy, it has proven
difficult to implement technological cooperation (Seidel
1974, 10-14). Difficulties are traceable in part to uneven
technological levels. Brazil may sell technology to Bolivia
and Colombia, but it does not thereby gain much useful
knowledge for conducting its negotiations with the United
States. In addition to mere commercial contracts,
institutional cooperation is needed on such issues as
information exchange, bargaining strategies, training,
regional research, and diverse efforts to change existing
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legislation on proprietary knowledge. Also, concerted
action must include the provision of advisory services,
financing, and the promotion of local values through the
development of technologies adapted to these.
Information Exchanges
Latin American countries may find it useful to
collaborate in setting up monitoring teams to gather
information supportive of the policy of "opening up the
package." In this sense, as Jan Tinbergen (1974, 9)
suggests, creating a "new autonomous institute for
technological exchange to link suppliers (enterprises and
universities) with user-countries... In this, universities
and user-countries could act as counter-weights against
enterprises ."
Bargaining Position
Efforts by Latin American representatives must center
on adopting common positions on such issues as economic
rights, sovereignity over resources, and controlling
activities of foreign suppliers of technology. Pressure
must also be applied to get approval of codes of conduct
governing foreign investment and technology transfer. Such
codes must include norms for negotiated technology
purchases, training national personnel, rules for technical
supervision, and terms of sales to third countries. If a
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large number of Latin American countries reach a common
position on these issues, it is more likely to have
negotiations much more equitable with multinational
corporations. Success in codes, however, is conditioned by
the level of political commitment governments assume.
Joint Training
Argentina has pioneered an autonomous approach to
nuclear-energy production using natural uranium (Sabato
1973, 1:23-28). This example hints at increasing Latin
American abilities to provide training in some sectors,
which is another way of "horizontalizing" relations. The
road to autonomy lies in building a network embracing
training policy, professional incentive systems, and
criteria for weighing efficiency and lessened dependence.
Cooperation in Research and Development Infrastructure
The usual argument against building research facilities
in developing countries is that domestic markets are too
small to support them. Large countries like Brazil and
Argentina can identify specific sectors in which national
research is warranted in scale terms (Ranis 1972, 34). In
this sense, Sagasti and Guerrero suggest that Andean
sub-regional talents mobilize and create their own
transnational corporations, some of which should engage in
research and development on behalf of the region (Sagasti
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and Guerrero 1974, 98).
Modifying Existing Legislation on Proprietary Knowledge
The basis for considering knowledge to be proprietary
is positive law, expressed in the form of international
agreements and national legislation on intellectual
property. If current rules governing proprietary knowledge
are maintained, poor countries can never achieve relative
technological parity with the rich. Unless technology
becomes "the common patrimony of the human race,"
inequitable rewards will continue to be gained by those who
already enjoy a privileged position in technological
arenas. Perhaps, the long-term task consists in creating
a noncommercial basis for technology-research on the basis
of priority need altering the role of research and
development activities as mere adjuncts of profit-seeking
enterprises
.
Obviously many Latin American governments are shy away
from cooperation with others; mutual distrust is perhaps the
major political obstacle blocking concerted action. Yet
this obstacle is not absolute. In the final analysis, the
developing countries will not achieve self-development and
attain real independence in a perspective of international
scientific collaboration unless they be themselves active
agents of their own transformation through their own
knowledge and with the active support of the developed
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regions of the world. The real battle for development, once
again, is fought by the national of developing countries
under their own constraints with their own resources.
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CONCLUSION
The present report has identified the background of the
technology transfer process (Part I) and the need to treat
technology explicitly in planning in the spectrum of
development strategies available to planners and
decision-makers in the Latin American nations (Part II).
Most countries in the world seek to get access to
modern technologies, at a fair price, in a mode which allows
them to make optimal use of their local resources and in
ways which minimize their dependency on outside suppliers.
In order to reflect these desires on concrete policies, any
society must assess its constraints and the power it has for
implementing its wishes. Both constraints and power,
however, vary widely.
Large countries such as Brazil, Argentina, or Algeria
for instance, may look for a degree of technological
"modernity" - even by following the path of high
technological imports - while sacrificing on other
objectives such as optimization of local resource use. They
hope, eventually, to achieve technological efficiency. Many
smaller countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, or Paraguay, on
the other hand, may find that their chronic need to purchase
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foreign technology invalidates their hope of getting
relative technological autonomy. Beyond such variables the
decisive elements in policy are the basic options and
development strategies selected by a society.
What is important here is to relate science and
technology policies directly to overall planning objectives
and to assure that measures taken to attract or control
technology are coherent and supportive of society's broadest
goals.
The instruments which have been used by Latin American
governments such as mandatory registry of technology
contracts, ceiling on payments, requirements to use local
technology where available, etc., tend to reduce dependency
and minimize costs. But control alone is not enough.
National and regional science and technology capacities must
be built up. Thus, emphasis must be placed on new forms of
training, creating local research and development facilities
to promote a range of "appropriate" technologies responsive
to local factors and large social objectives.
Throughout any actions incentives are central to
purchasers of technology, to intermediate agencies
(financial and consulting firms), and to the actual human
resource. Individual countries need to discover new
combinations with other Third World actors, and support by
appropriate international actions. Third World
policy-making, however, does not take place in isolation.
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The context of technology is an international order
dominated by transnational corporations, international
agencies, and big power governments. As Indian economist
Rajni Kothari writes (Kothari 1974, 9), it is no longer
possible to bring successful change in one area, except in
very marginal ways, without taking account of the world
context. Technology, then, is not static. Rather, it is a
dynamic social force which provides its possessors economic,
political, and cultural power.
Because it is never possible to make great gains
without paying social and human costs, the criteria for
deciding which costs will be viewed as tolerable must be
defined, preferable after consultation with the intended
beneficiaries of policy and, above all, with the people
which must bear those costs. Furthermore, as Denis Goulet
writes (Goulet 1977, 251),
As all societies struggle to create a world of genuine
development, value conflicts will endure. But these
conflicts, like technology itself, can prove
beneficial. The key lies in the criteria chosen to
decide which values will be destroyed and which will be
preserved. Technology is indeed a two-edged sword, at
once beneficent and destructive. But so is development
itself. So is all of human history.
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How is technology related to development? Can
technology be "transferred" from one cultural setting to
another in ways which are more beneficial than destructive?
How do policies for becoming technologically "modern" relate
to development goals in diverse nations? These questions
constitute the heart of the present report.
Technology is a vast domain touching all sectors of
human activity; it is also a dynamic force which provides
its possessors economic, political, and cultural power.
Voluminous writings on "technology transfer" have now
made their way into the literature on development. Because
some choice regarding manageability of data has to be made,
this report concentrates on industrial technologies used in
production, with secondary attention paid to agricultural
and communication technologies. The present report centers
on transactions between developed countries and Latin
America, but even within that continent, comprehensiveness
coverage has not been attempted. In addition, the study is
situated primarily at the level of relations conducted
across national boundaries. Nonetheless, tensions between
national decision-makers and nonexpert majorities hover
constantly in the background, especially when criteria for
technology policy are discussed and incompatibilities appear
between technological efficiency and national goals such as
social justice and job-creation.
One major premise of this report is the existence of
the vital connection which links the value content of modern
technology to development strategies and public policy
adopted in less-developed countries.
The background of the technology transfer process is
presented in Part I of this report, in which competing views
of benefits sought in technological exchanges are examined.
Many conflicts have been traceable to technology itself, not
merely to the mechanisms by which it is "transferred" from
one national setting to another. Within this context,
technology is then analyzed in terms of its own values,
dynamisms and institutional framework, where basic questions
of freedom and just society are raised.
In Part II, this report moves beyond this general
background of technology and formulates ethical strategies
in the arena of development decision-making. In this
section of the report, it is particularly useful to see the
link which binds a society's basic value options to its
preferred development strategies and to its technology
policy. Many na tiona 1- technol og y policy-makers in Latin
America appear not to notice this link; yet no technology
policy can succeed if it is not expressly designed to
reinforce the social values pursued, in some scale of
priorities, by the development strategy adopted. Beyond
such variables, what is important here is to relate science
and technology policies directly to overall planning
objectives and to assure that measures taken to control
technology are coherent and supportive of a society's
broadest goals. But control alone is not enough. National
and regional science and technology capacities must be
built up. Thus, emphasis must be placed on new forms of
training, creating local research and development facilities
in order to promote a range of "appropriate" technologies
responsive to local factors and social objectives.
Throughout any actions, incentives are central to
purchasers and sellers of technology, to intermediate
agencies (financial and consulting firms), and to the actual
human resources. Thus, individual countries need to
discover new combinations with other Third World actors in
an environment of partnership and cooperation. Third World
policy-making, however, does not take place in isolation.
The context of technology is an international order
dominated by transnational corporations, international
agencies, and big power governments. Yet this obstacle is
not absolute. The stress for the future might more suitably
be placed, not on the ways in which developed countries
should "hand over" technology to developing countries, but
on the ways in which both parties can cooperate to engender
the growth of technology capacity in developing countries.
It is precisely through this cooperation that the developing
countries of Latin America might be able to acquire the
foreign technology under the best financial, technical,
political, and social conditions, as well as to expand their
capacity to absorb technology as part of the process of
developing a degree of technological economy in the long
term.
